Thursday, September 17, 2026

Fw: Project Paws - Real Estate Inquiry



Henry McClure
785.383.9994 

Sent from my T-Mobile 5G Device
Get Outlook for Android

From: Ashley Lehman <ashley.lehman@topekapartnership.com>
Sent: Thursday, 17 September 2026 08:27:00
Cc: Ashley Lehman <ashley.lehman@topekapartnership.com>
Subject: Project Paws - Real Estate Inquiry
 

Hello,

 

The Kansas Department of Commerce is working directly with a company that would like to review real estate options for a possible production/R&D/sales/distribution facility. At this time, they are only interested in existing facility to purchase, not lease.  

 

Timeline: As soon as possible. Within 3 months. Operational 10+ months after purchase.

 

Can you please review the criteria below and share any possible buildings that match the requirements by September 23rd.

 

Minimum Site Requirements:

  • EXISTING BUILDINGS FOR SALE with a target between 79k-87k sq ft. Comparable larger facilities may also be considered. (7-20 acres preferred)
  • Minimum 30 ft clear height.
  • Loading: 5 truck loading positions /dock-high doors; Facility must accommodate 53-ft semi-trailers.
  • Heavy duty industrial slab suitable for cold storage and food processing equipment. Targeting approximately 8-10” concrete where applicable and floor load around 1000 psf.
  • Large trucks must be able to enter, maneuver, load/unload, and exit without operational restrictions.
  • Preferably within 5 miles of an interstate highway with 24/7 heavy-truck traffic permitted.
  • Prefers Kansas City metro, but may review other options especially if within a 1-hour drive to an airport.
  • Rail is preferred, but not mandatory.

 

Thank you,

 

Uploaded Image

Please take a survey and share your perspective about the future of Topeka, Shawnee County.

English: https://www.surveymonkey.com/r/GTStrategy

Spanish: El Plan Estratégico Comunitario de 5 Años para Topeka y el Condado de Shawnee

 

Wednesday, September 16, 2026

Fw: Business entrance/exit issue for ADA Transportation



Henry McClure
785.383.9994 

Sent from my T-Mobile 5G Device
Get Outlook for Android

From: Valley Park <valleyparkniatopeka@gmail.com>
Sent: Wednesday, 16 September 2026 21:16:32
To: Zaynah Afada <zafada@topeka.org>; Braxton Copley <bcopley@topeka.org>; Spencer Duncan <sduncan@topeka.org>
Cc: City Manager <citymanager@topeka.org>
Subject: Business entrance/exit issue for ADA Transportation
 
Hi Spencer, Braxton, and Zaynah,  

It sounded like we lost the whole underbelly of our ADA modified van the last time we left the Tuptim Thai restaurant due the slope of the entrance/exit not being what it should be! This issue, I predict, is an engineering matter since city street projects often include replacements of business and residential entrances/exits. 

I am not sure a warning sign would help as the parking lot can be a little congestive during certain times of the day and traffic on 29th ST can be rather busy too. A driver doesn't know the slope issue is a problem, until it is too late. How would Visit Topeka address the issue to support this local eatery when marking to those relying on ADA transportation? 

I am not sure who is chairing the ADA Advisory Council nor who the appropriate person is to address the entrance/exit off of 29th ST to the Tuptim Thai restaurant located in front of their building and closest to the handicap parking. I wanted to make sure that this issue gets on someone's priority to-do list to address accessibility within the City of Topeka.

I would appreciate a response as to a resolution to this matter. Thanks for your consideration. 

Susan W. McClacherty
2021-2022, 2024-2025 Citizen Advisory Council Chair

It all depends on what direction you guys want to take this city.

Yes. There is a real literature on this, and the short version is: **generous housing and homeless services can help the people who receive them and still fail—or even worsen—the city’s overall problem.** The “magnet” story is only one piece. The more common backfire is a **stock-and-flow problem**: people keep falling into homelessness faster than expensive programs can house them, while Housing First-style units with no treatment requirements can become long-term, high-cost holding pens rather than exits.

The evidence is mixed by *who* is moving and *what* is being offered. It is not a myth, and it is not a simple “they all hitchhiked here for free apartments” cartoon either.

## What the studies actually show

**1. Families respond to generosity. Single adults, much less so.**  
Economist Igor Popov’s work using federal Continuum of Care grant formulas (an old, quasi-random funding rule) is the cleanest U.S. evidence. Extra homeless-assistance money:

- Houses people who would otherwise be unsheltered.
- Does **not** pull a large new population of *single adults* into the local homeless count.
- **Does** pull *homeless families*. Roughly two-thirds of the extra family caseload comes from families who became homeless in another community and then moved. An extra $100,000 in local grant funding was associated with on the order of 70–85 more people in homeless families using that community’s system.

That is a welfare-magnet result, but it is concentrated in families, who are more mobile and more likely to shop for shelter and services.

**2. Broader social-service expansions can raise the count.**  
A paper on ACA Medicaid expansion found homelessness rates rose about 12% in expansion states versus non-expansion states, driven by unsheltered and chronically homeless people. The authors treat that as evidence that people with few resources will move toward places that deliver more health and social services.

**3. Permanent supportive housing (PSH) reduces the local count only modestly.**  
Panel studies of PSH beds nationwide find one extra PSH bed associated with something like 0.04–0.12 fewer people in the homeless count—far less than “one bed, one person off the street.” Researchers list migration toward expanding PSH as one reason the local effect is muted.

**4. Most people are still local.**  
The large UCSF California survey found about 90% of people experiencing homelessness lost their last housing *in California*, and 75% were in the same county. Interstate “they all came from Ohio” migration is overstated. Short-distance and intra-metro movement is not.

**5. Housing costs dominate the *level* of homelessness.**  
Pew and a long line of research show high rents and tight housing supply are the strongest predictors of *how many* people are homeless in a metro. Services layered on top of a broken housing market do not cancel that. They can change *where* people sleep and *who* shows up in the local system.

So the honest mechanism is usually some mix of:

- Inflow from unaffordable rents, evictions, addiction, and mental illness faster than outflow.
- Families (and some singles) relocating toward better shelter, Medicaid, and cash-like services.
- Housing First units that stabilize housing status without requiring treatment—so the same people stay expensive to serve, overdose in city-funded buildings, or cycle.
- Visible street homelessness that persists even as the city “houses” thousands, because the pipeline never empties.

That is the backfire: taxpayers fund a large industry, individual clients often get a roof, and the city’s street problem and bill keep growing.

## Three cities where high taxpayer housing/services spend did not close the gap

These are not the only examples. They are the clearest West Coast cases of big dedicated taxes, Housing First / low-barrier housing, and counts that did not fall in proportion to the money.

### 1. Portland metro (Multnomah + Metro’s Supportive Housing Services tax)

This is the cleanest “we opened the door and it overflowed” case.

In 2017–18 Multnomah County tried to shelter **every** homeless family. Less than half the families who checked into shelter said their last address was in Portland or Multnomah County. Shelters overflowed, the county put nearly 100 families in motels, the budget blew up, and the open-door policy ended. The Seattle Times called it one of the few well-documented magnet episodes.

Then voters passed Metro’s 2020 Supportive Housing Services tax (1% on high earners and large businesses) on the promise of ending the crisis in ten years. It has raised on the order of **$1.4–1.6 billion**. The region has added thousands of shelter beds and placed thousands of households into housing. Inflow still outran outflow: for a stretch, about 14 people became homeless for every 10 placed. Point-in-time counts in the tri-county area jumped sharply (one comparison is a 61% increase 2023–2025); later regional estimates put the homeless population around 12,000 on a count night and higher in administrative data. Voters are now deeply skeptical the tax “ended” anything.

What backfired: an explicit “shelter everyone” rule pulled families from outside the county; a huge dedicated tax improved services and still could not outrun new homelessness plus regional in-migration. The tax did not fail to house people. It failed to shrink the problem the public was sold.

### 2. Seattle / King County

King County’s Regional Homelessness Authority and the city have spent on the order of **$1 billion+** through the authority over several years, plus large city Human Services budgets (Seattle’s homelessness-related spend has been in the $190 million range in recent years, on top of county and Health Through Housing sales-tax programs). Shelter and housing inventory went up. The point-in-time count still rose: roughly 13,400 (2022) → 16,900 (2024) → **18,365 (2026)**, with about **64% unsheltered**. That is thousands more people after years of elevated spending. A forensic audit of the authority also found overspending and weak controls—an accountability failure layered on a results failure.

City materials have also noted that a large share of unsheltered people surveyed in the Seattle metro said their last stable residence was **not Seattle**—i.e., a regional magnet into the city that runs the biggest shelter and service system.

What backfired: Housing First plus high tech-driven rents produced a large unsheltered population that services could process but not shrink. Money bought more beds and more nonprofit capacity; the street count and the bill both went up. Seattle is the textbook “booming city, booming rents, booming homeless budget” case.

### 3. San Francisco

San Francisco has spent at a level few cities can match. The Department of Homelessness and Supportive Housing budget has been in the **$700–830 million** range in recent years, heavily funded by Prop C / “Our City, Our Home” business taxes plus general fund. From 2007 through the mid-2020s the homeless count rose on the order of 40%+ even as spending exploded. Critics (and a civil grand jury) have argued the system put vulnerable people at risk, exits to stable housing lagged, and some city-funded housing became sites of heavy drug use—UCSF/DPH work has been cited showing a large share of overdose deaths among people with a fixed address in city-supported housing.

The 2026 point-in-time count finally showed movement the other way: total homelessness down about 4% (8,323 → 7,973) and **unsheltered down 22%** to the lowest since 2011, with a higher sheltered share. Family homelessness, however, rose. That recent dip came after a shift toward more shelter, outreach, and treatment-oriented “breaking the cycle” tactics—not after another decade of the same unconstrained Housing First mix. Even so, the city still runs a ~$800 million system for under 8,000 people on a given night and more than 20,000 system users over a year. Per-person cost is enormous relative to outcomes over the previous decade.

What backfired for years: unmatched per-capita spending plus low-barrier housing and services coexisted with a growing, highly visible street population and weak accountability. The magnet piece is smaller than the folklore (most people last housed in California), but SF was still a destination inside the state for services, weather, and a high-tolerance street environment. The recent improvement is itself evidence that *how* the money is used matters as much as how much is spent.

---

**Los Angeles** is the larger cousin: Measure H, then Measure A, plus HHH and city budgets that grew from roughly $140 million toward **$1 billion** a year at the city level, with county spending on top. The county housed well over 100,000 people over time and still sits near **73,000** on the latest count after a stall. Same pattern: huge placements, huge inflow, huge bill.

## How to read this without the culture-war version

Programs that give a specific person a unit usually help *that person* stay housed in the short run. Several LA studies of rapid rehousing and placements find lower return to the homeless system for the treated individual. That can be true at the same time the *city’s* count and costs rise.

The backfire is at the system level:

| What cities hoped | What often happened |
|---|---|
| More PSH / RRH / shelter → fewer people on the street | Inflow from rents + addiction outruns outflow; count stays high or rises |
| Low-barrier housing is humane and cheaper than jail/ER | Units fill; treatment is optional; overdoses and chaos concentrate in and around the buildings |
| Generous services are a local public good | Families (and some singles) relocate toward the generous CoC; neighboring places free-ride |
| “Housing is the solution” | Housing without enough supply, work/treatment expectations, or enforcement becomes a parallel welfare system that never empties |

If the policy goal is “house the people already here and shrink the street problem,” the research points toward: tight targeting, treatment requirements for the chronically addicted/mentally ill, enough market housing so low-income people are not pushed out, and not advertising an open-ended entitlement that neighboring counties can dump into. If the goal is “maximize beds with no conditions,” the West Coast decade is the experiment—and the counts and tax bills are the result.

Henry McClure
785.383.9994 

Sent from my T-Mobile 5G Device
Get Outlook for Android

KORA

What is the City/County/JEDO policy about this spending 

Kansas law will void a city or county contract in defined situations. It does not say that every time a contractor spends a dollar wrong, the whole agreement disappears by itself. The distinction matters.
When Kansas law actually says “void”
The rule is aimed at the government’s power to make the contract, not at every later mistake in performance.
Kansas courts repeat the same points:
  • A city or county cannot bind itself beyond its powers. A contract it had no power to make is ultra vires, void, and unenforceable. No further validity analysis is required.
  • Anyone who contracts with a municipality is bound, at that party’s peril, to know the municipality’s authority.
  • Contracts a municipality is not legally permitted to enter cannot be ratified. Performance by the contractor, money spent in reliance, and benefits received by the city do not estop the government from saying the contract was void.
  • Cash-basis law, K.S.A. 10-1119: any contract between a municipal governing body and any person that violates the cash-basis act shall be void. Orders and warrants drawn in violation are void. An appropriation for a municipal fund shall not be used for any other purpose. Debt above the budgeted amount is void.
  • State ex rel. Hecht v. City of Topeka: contracts in violation of the cash-basis law are void; a contract the city was not legally allowed to enter is ultra vires, void, and unenforceable. Even estoppel will not save a contract made in express violation of law.
That is the “null and void” doctrine in Kansas city and county law. It fits illegal formation (no authority, no vote, cash-basis breach, mandatory bidding ignored, purpose the electorate never approved) better than “the contractor later wrote a banquet check.”
What does not automatically void the master contract
A lawful services contract can still exist while some payments under it are unauthorized.
If JEDO had power to hire an economic-development contractor, the interlocal allowed it, and the board voted the agreement, a later banquet or civic sponsorship does not, by itself, erase the service contract. What it can do is this:
  1. Mark that payment as unauthorized use of special-purpose tax money (ballot + K.S.A. 12-187(g) + AG 2001-014 + AG 2017-015 + “only as specified in the JEDO budget”).
  2. Support recovery of the illegal outlay from the contractor or the recipient.
  3. Support termination for cause if the contract says grant-fund spending is limited to the approved budget and the contractor blew that limit.
  4. Support a False Claims action if someone knowingly presented a false claim for payment (K.S.A. 75-7503: treble damages and civil penalties to the political subdivision).
  5. In a severe case, support misuse of public funds charges against a person who had control of public money and used it in a manner not authorized by law (K.S.A. 21-6005). That statute forfeits the official position of a convicted custodian. It is not a self-executing repeal of the GO Topeka contract.
Courts also try not to strike an entire contract as contrary to statute unless the legislature intended that result. Illegal pieces can fall while the rest stands, unless the whole bargain was outside municipal power.
The local precedent you already have
July 2004: Judge Theis held JEDO should have bid the GO Topeka contract because the City was part of JEDO and city ordinance required bids. He treated that contract as illegal and void if the plaintiffs amended and asked the court to set it aside. They did not amend. JEDO then passed a bid-exemption resolution. Theis later ruled for JEDO because the suit was not amended. That is the opposite of “the contract vanished by operation of law with no further action.” Someone had to sue, plead the right remedy, and finish the case.
So even when a Shawnee County judge said the JEDO–GO Topeka contract was illegal for failure to bid, the contract did not drop dead in the file room. The public body re-authorized the arrangement. That is why “null and void” is a claim you prove in court or a finding the board makes and then stops paying, not a slogan that ends the relationship on the day the banquet check clears.
How to state it for city and county without overclaiming
Use this, not “the contractor sinned, therefore the contract is air”:
Formation. If the city, county, or JEDO never had power to spend half-cent money for that purpose, or entered the contract in violation of cash-basis, bidding, or the ballot, Kansas treats that contract as void. The contractor is charged with knowledge of those limits. Benefits received do not save it.
Performance. If the master contract was valid but the contractor spent voter-pledged money on uses the ballot, interlocal, and JEDO budget did not specify, those expenditures are unauthorized. The agency can demand repayment, refuse further draws, terminate under the contract, and, if the claim for payment was false, use the Kansas False Claims Act. The master contract dies when the board terminates it or a court declares it void—not by the fact of the check alone.
Duty of the public officers. Officers who sit mute while a contractor treats special-purpose tax as a customer-loyalty fund are not protected by “the contractor did it.” Public money in a political subdivision remains public money. K.S.A. 21-6005 reaches a person who has control of it by virtue of official position.
That is the accurate city/county rule. Banquet spending, if unauthorized, is a strong argument that those dollars were illegal and recoverable, and that JEDO may terminate. It is a weaker argument that twenty years of service agreements were void from the first signature unless you also show JEDO lacked power to hire the contractor or that the contract itself was made in express violation of law—the 2004 bidding problem Theis already identified, which the board then tried to paper over.

Duty of the public officers. Officers who sit mute while a contractor treats special-purpose tax as a customer-loyalty fund are not protected by “the contractor did it.” Public money in a political subdivision remains public money. K.S.A. 21-6005 reaches a person who has control of it by virtue of official position.

 Kansas law will void a city or county contract in defined situations. It does not say that every time a contractor spends a dollar wrong, the whole agreement disappears by itself. The distinction matters.

When Kansas law actually says “void”

The rule is aimed at the government’s power to make the contract, not at every later mistake in performance.

Kansas courts repeat the same points:

  • A city or county cannot bind itself beyond its powers. A contract it had no power to make is ultra vires, void, and unenforceable. No further validity analysis is required.
  • Anyone who contracts with a municipality is bound, at that party’s peril, to know the municipality’s authority.
  • Contracts a municipality is not legally permitted to enter cannot be ratified. Performance by the contractor, money spent in reliance, and benefits received by the city do not estop the government from saying the contract was void.
  • Cash-basis law, K.S.A. 10-1119: any contract between a municipal governing body and any person that violates the cash-basis act shall be void. Orders and warrants drawn in violation are void. An appropriation for a municipal fund shall not be used for any other purpose. Debt above the budgeted amount is void.
  • State ex rel. Hecht v. City of Topeka: contracts in violation of the cash-basis law are void; a contract the city was not legally allowed to enter is ultra vires, void, and unenforceable. Even estoppel will not save a contract made in express violation of law.

That is the “null and void” doctrine in Kansas city and county law. It fits illegal formation (no authority, no vote, cash-basis breach, mandatory bidding ignored, purpose the electorate never approved) better than “the contractor later wrote a banquet check.”

What does not automatically void the master contract

A lawful services contract can still exist while some payments under it are unauthorized.

If JEDO had power to hire an economic-development contractor, the interlocal allowed it, and the board voted the agreement, a later banquet or civic sponsorship does not, by itself, erase the service contract. What it can do is this:

  1. Mark that payment as unauthorized use of special-purpose tax money (ballot + K.S.A. 12-187(g) + AG 2001-014 + AG 2017-015 + “only as specified in the JEDO budget”).
  2. Support recovery of the illegal outlay from the contractor or the recipient.
  3. Support termination for cause if the contract says grant-fund spending is limited to the approved budget and the contractor blew that limit.
  4. Support a False Claims action if someone knowingly presented a false claim for payment (K.S.A. 75-7503: treble damages and civil penalties to the political subdivision).
  5. In a severe case, support misuse of public funds charges against a person who had control of public money and used it in a manner not authorized by law (K.S.A. 21-6005). That statute forfeits the official position of a convicted custodian. It is not a self-executing repeal of the GO Topeka contract.

Courts also try not to strike an entire contract as contrary to statute unless the legislature intended that result. Illegal pieces can fall while the rest stands, unless the whole bargain was outside municipal power.

The local precedent you already have

July 2004: Judge Theis held JEDO should have bid the GO Topeka contract because the City was part of JEDO and city ordinance required bids. He treated that contract as illegal and void if the plaintiffs amended and asked the court to set it aside. They did not amend. JEDO then passed a bid-exemption resolution. Theis later ruled for JEDO because the suit was not amended. That is the opposite of “the contract vanished by operation of law with no further action.” Someone had to sue, plead the right remedy, and finish the case.

So even when a Shawnee County judge said the JEDO–GO Topeka contract was illegal for failure to bid, the contract did not drop dead in the file room. The public body re-authorized the arrangement. That is why “null and void” is a claim you prove in court or a finding the board makes and then stops paying, not a slogan that ends the relationship on the day the banquet check clears.

How to state it for city and county without overclaiming

Use this, not “the contractor sinned, therefore the contract is air”:

Formation. If the city, county, or JEDO never had power to spend half-cent money for that purpose, or entered the contract in violation of cash-basis, bidding, or the ballot, Kansas treats that contract as void. The contractor is charged with knowledge of those limits. Benefits received do not save it.

Performance. If the master contract was valid but the contractor spent voter-pledged money on uses the ballot, interlocal, and JEDO budget did not specify, those expenditures are unauthorized. The agency can demand repayment, refuse further draws, terminate under the contract, and, if the claim for payment was false, use the Kansas False Claims Act. The master contract dies when the board terminates it or a court declares it void—not by the fact of the check alone.

Duty of the public officers. Officers who sit mute while a contractor treats special-purpose tax as a customer-loyalty fund are not protected by “the contractor did it.” Public money in a political subdivision remains public money. K.S.A. 21-6005 reaches a person who has control of it by virtue of official position.

That is the accurate city/county rule. Banquet spending, if unauthorized, is a strong argument that those dollars were illegal and recoverable, and that JEDO may terminate. It is a weaker argument that twenty years of service agreements were void from the first signature unless you also show JEDO lacked power to hire the contractor or that the contract itself was made in express violation of law—the 2004 bidding problem Theis already identified, which the board then tried to paper over.