Noted ✅️

The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) issued an urgent cybersecurity advisory warning public and corporate users about a sophisticated phishing platform named Kali365. This "Phishing-as-a-Service" toolkit specifically targets Microsoft 365 environments—including Outlook, Teams, and OneDrive accounts—allowing attackers to bypass traditional multi-factor authentication (MFA) and gain persistent control. [1, 2, 3, 4] 

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## 🛡️ How the "Kali365" Attack Works

Unlike traditional phishing schemes that seek to steal a victim's password, Kali365 abuses Microsoft's legitimate OAuth device registration workflow. [5, 6] 

   1. The Phishing Lure: Victims receive a highly convincing email designed to look like a trusted cloud collaboration or document-sharing service. The lure often mimics fake Microsoft Teams message notifications or secure business voicemail alerts. [2, 7, 8, 9] 

   2. The Device Code Trick: The email displays a specific alphanumeric code and instructs the recipient to visit a legitimate Microsoft device verification page (such as ://microsoft.com) to insert the code. [2, 7] 

   3. The Token Hijacking: Because the user enters the code on a real, official Microsoft page, the victim unknowingly authorizes a new device connection. The Kali365 platform instantly intercepts the generated OAuth authentication tokens. [2, 3, 7, 10] 

   4. Bypassing MFA: With these stolen session tokens, cybercriminals maintain persistent access to the victim's inbox, files, and chat records. They can log in freely without ever needing the account password or triggering subsequent MFA prompts. [3, 4, 7, 10] 

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## 🛑 FBI Recommended Mitigation Steps

Since traditional MFA is insufficient against session token theft, the FBI advises organizations and users to apply a layered security approach: [3, 4] 

* Enforce Conditional Access Policies: Enterprise administrators should create strict policies within Microsoft Entra ID to block or limit device code flows for standard users. [6, 7, 10] 

* Disable Cross-Device Auth Transfers: Block the setting that permits users to seamlessly pass or transfer authenticated sessions from personal computers over to mobile devices. [3, 10] 

* Protect Emergency Logins: When disabling device code flows company-wide, ensure break-glass or emergency-access admin accounts are excluded to prevent complete system lockouts. [3, 10] 

* Audit Active Sessions: Regularly inspect enterprise access logs for unauthorized active sessions, unfamiliar device footprints, or abnormal geolocation logins. [7, 8] 

------------------------------

## 📝 What to Do If You're Targeted

If you encounter a suspicious device-link email or suspect your account has been breached, the FBI requests that you file an official cybersecurity incident report through the FBI Internet Crime Complaint Center (IC3). [3, 7] 

When submitting, provide as much evidence as possible, including full email header data, the unredacted email body, any unauthorized devices added to your Microsoft account, and the timestamps or IP addresses associated with suspicious login attempts. [3, 7] 

[1] [https://www.facebook.com](https://www.facebook.com/fox5dc/posts/the-fbi-is-alerting-the-public-to-a-new-cyber-threat-involving-a-phishingasaserv/1464038702427352/)

[2] [https://www.livenowfox.com](https://www.livenowfox.com/news/fbi-alert-outlook-onedrive)

[3] [https://www.fox10phoenix.com](https://www.fox10phoenix.com/news/fbi-alert-outlook-onedrive)

[4] [https://invenioit.com](https://invenioit.com/security/fbi-microsoft-365-phishing-scam/)

[5] [https://www.inc.com](https://www.inc.com/amaya-nichole/fbi-just-issued-urgent-warning-anyone-using-microsoft-over-new-phishing-scheme/91351360)

[6] [https://www.facebook.com](https://www.facebook.com/fox29philadelphia/posts/the-fbi-is-warning-the-public-about-a-new-phishing-scam-called-kali365-that-allo/1448599040635887/)

[7] [https://www.govtech.com](https://www.govtech.com/security/fbi-issues-scam-warning-for-users-of-microsoft-outlook-teams)

[8] [https://www.facebook.com](https://www.facebook.com/FOX10Phoenix/posts/the-fbi-is-warning-the-public-about-a-new-phishing-scam-called-kali365-that-allo/1324814363186020/)

[9] [https://www.facebook.com](https://www.facebook.com/wfaa/posts/fbi-warning-%EF%B8%8F-a-new-phishing-tool-can-bypass-microsoft-365-multi-factor-authenti/1460840062746813/)

[10] [https://www.kark.com](https://www.kark.com/news/national-news/cyber-attackers-are-hijacking-microsoft-outlook-teams-and-365-log-ins-fbi-says/)

Henry McClure

785.383.9994 

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Credit Rating History =

Topeka’s Credit Ratings, Bonds, and Borrowing Power (2005–2026): Impact of Leadership Turnover

Topeka transitioned to the council-manager system in 2005 amid hopes for more professional, stable administration. However, the high turnover in city managers and interims (detailed in prior timelines) coincided with a period of financial management challenges, including reliance on reserves, budget pressures, and modest economic growth. While the city’s credit ratings have remained relatively stable in the upper-medium grade range, the frequent leadership changes likely contributed to a more conservative, reactive fiscal posture that has constrained bolder long-term planning and potentially increased borrowing costs indirectly.

Credit Rating History

Topeka’s general obligation (GO) bonds — backed by the full faith and credit of the city — have generally held steady ratings:

• Moody’s Investors Service: Long-term issuer/GO rating consistently at Aa3 (upper-medium grade) in available records from the early 2010s through 2024–2026. This was affirmed in multiple bond issuances (e.g., 2020 utility bonds, 2024 reviews). Aa3 reflects a strong but not elite capacity to meet obligations, with some vulnerability to economic shifts.
• S&P Global Ratings: AA long-term rating with stable outlook for GO bonds in multiple issuances (2021, 2023, 2024, 2025). This has been consistent in rating reports, supported by very strong reserves and financial policies, though tempered by an adequate economy and weak debt position relative to revenue.
• Fitch Ratings: Limited specific mentions for the city proper, but aligned with stable investment-grade assessments.

Key observation: No major downgrades tied directly to city manager turnover appear in public records. Ratings have held despite leadership churn, thanks to strong reserve policies (e.g., targeting 15–20% unassigned fund balance), sales tax revenue stability, and conservative debt practices. However, the lack of upward movement (e.g., to Aa2 or AA+) amid national peers’ improvements may reflect the cumulative drag of inconsistency.

State-level Kansas ratings (Aa2 from Moody’s with recent positive outlook in 2026) provide a supportive backdrop, but city-specific factors dominate local borrowing.

Bond Issuances and Debt Trends (2005–2026)

• Debt Levels: Total bonded indebtedness grew from ~$298 million in 2013 to ~$524.5 million by end of 2024. GO debt (core taxpayer-backed) has fluctuated but trended downward in recent years (e.g., decreased by ~$4M or 2.9% in 2024; down significantly from peaks). Revenue bonds (utility-backed) increased more substantially.
• Major Issuances: Frequent GO and utility revenue bonds for infrastructure (streets, water/sewer upgrades, levees, etc.). Examples include 2021 refunding/improvement bonds (~$38M total), 2023-A GO bonds, 2024-A, and 2025 series. These were routinely rated AA/Aa3, allowing market access at reasonable rates.
• Debt Limits and Capacity: Kansas law caps GO debt at 30% of assessed valuation. Topeka has stayed well under this (e.g., ~27.9% usage in recent years), preserving borrowing room. Legal debt margin remains healthy.
• Borrowing Costs: Stable ratings mean competitive interest rates, but not the lowest possible. Frequent leadership transitions may have led to more refundings (to manage costs) rather than transformative projects. Short-term temporary notes have also been used for interim financing.

Impacts of the Revolving Door on Finances and Borrowing Power

The ~10–12 leadership transitions since 2005 (5 permanents + multiple interims) created measurable drags:

• Disrupted Planning and Institutional Knowledge: New managers (and interims) require time to assess finances, often leading to short-term budgeting. This contributed to patterns of drawing down reserves for operating deficits (e.g., projected $15M+ gaps in 2027 discussions) rather than structural reforms. Long-term capital plans (5-year CIP) exist but face execution risks with each change.
• Reactive vs. Proactive Management: Firings/resignations (e.g., terminations of Bonaparte and Wade) create uncertainty. Rating agencies note strong policies but highlight adequate (not exceptional) budgetary performance and economic base. Turnover likely amplified reliance on one-time fixes, reserves, and sales tax (vulnerable to economic cycles).
• Staff and Morale Effects: Repeated onboarding erodes expertise in finance departments, potentially leading to higher internal costs or missed efficiencies. This indirectly weakens credit narratives around "very strong" management.
• Borrowing Power Outcomes:
  • Not Weaker Overall: Access to markets remains solid; no defaults or near-misses. Debt service coverage stays satisfactory.
  • Opportunity Cost: Stable but not upgraded ratings mean slightly higher interest costs than top-tier peers. Inability to pursue more aggressive growth-oriented debt (e.g., for major economic development) due to perceived instability may have limited diversification beyond government/services.
  • Current Strain: Recent budgets show pressure — using reserves, personnel costs rising, revenue lagging in some projections. This echoes national findings that high municipal turnover correlates with weaker long-term fiscal outcomes.

No Bright Spots in This Context: While ratings held, the "consistently inconsistent" leadership has reinforced stagnation. A more stable executive team could have built stronger reserves, diversified revenue, or executed visionary infrastructure/economic plans to boost the tax base and ratings. Instead, Topeka maintains a solid-but-not-outstanding profile — adequate for survival but insufficient for breaking out of slow-growth patterns.

In summary, turnover has not caused a credit crisis but has contributed to a ceiling on potential. Borrowing power is intact yet underutilized for transformative change. For the absolute latest, review the City’s most recent ACFR or rating reports on EMMA (MSRB) 

why spend the money?

Topeka’s Economic Stagnation: A Balanced Exploration

Topeka, Kansas, as the state capital, has long relied on government, services, education, healthcare, and some manufacturing/logistics. While it offers affordability and a central location, the city and its metro area show persistent signs of economic stagnation relative to faster-growing U.S. regions.

Population Trends

Topeka’s population has been largely flat or slightly declining for years:

• City proper: Peaked around 127,000–128,000 in the early 2010s; ~125,500 in recent estimates (2024–2025), with annual changes often near zero or negative (-0.15% to -0.65% in recent years).
• Metro/Shawnee County: Modest gains since 2020 (~2,000 new residents reported in some local updates), but overall long-term growth is minimal compared to national averages.

Kansas as a state has seen slow growth (~0.4% annual average since 2000), with domestic out-migration in many periods. Topeka struggles to attract and retain younger workers and families.

Economic Output and Jobs

• GDP: Topeka MSA real GDP was ~$12.2 billion (chained 2017 dollars) in 2023, showing modest growth from ~$11.7 billion in 2020 but limited acceleration.
• Employment: Government and services dominate (>50% of the economy). Unemployment hovers around 3.5–4.0% recently (close to or slightly below national averages), with stable but not booming job growth.
• Recent BLS data shows small fluctuations in sectors like manufacturing (stable but with some declines) and trade/transportation.

Local leaders note ~6% local economic growth since 2020 in some metrics, alongside targeted wins like logistics/distribution hubs (Walmart, Target, etc.) and financial services.

Income, Poverty, and Affordability

• Median household income: ~$56,956 (2024 data), below Kansas and national averages.
• Poverty rate: ~15.7% in Topeka (higher than Kansas ~10.9% and U.S. ~12.5%).
• Strengths: Lower cost of living and housing affordability compared to many metros, which some see as a draw (e.g., "Choose Topeka" relocation incentives).

Key Challenges Contributing to Stagnation

• Heavy Reliance on Government: As a capital city, public sector jobs provide stability but limit private-sector dynamism.
• Slow Growth and Out-Migration: Limited high-wage private industry diversity; challenges retaining talent.
• Housing and Infrastructure: Demand outpaces supply in some areas, with calls for more affordable units.
• Broader Perceptions: Rankings like WalletHub have placed Topeka lower on quality of life, education/health, despite affordability. High turnover in city leadership (as discussed previously) can hinder consistent long-term planning.

Kansas overall ranks mid-to-lower in private-sector job and wage growth in some analyses, with Topeka mirroring these state-level trends.

Positive Developments and Efforts

• Targeted Growth: Focus on logistics, food processing, financial services, and aerospace. Recent wins include Magellan Financial expansion (175 jobs expected, significant economic impact).
• Rankings: Topeka ranked #5 nationally for economic strength in Area Development’s 2024 report.
• Initiatives: Downtown revitalization, affordable housing funds, business incentives via GO Topeka/JEDO, and relocation programs. Infrastructure projects continue.
• Assets: Low business costs, central U.S. location, and institutions like Washburn University.

Outlook

Topeka isn’t in freefall — it has stability, affordability, and pockets of progress — but it lacks the rapid private-sector momentum seen in places like Kansas City or Wichita suburbs. Breaking stagnation likely requires sustained focus on diversifying the economy, improving quality-of-life factors (e.g., housing, amenities), and consistent leadership to execute long-term visions.

Like the "struggling flower on a vine" metaphor from our earlier discussion, Topeka has deep roots and potential but needs consistent nurturing to fully bloom. Local organizations like the Greater Topeka Partnership are actively working on this. What specific aspect (jobs, housing, etc.) would you like to dive deeper into?

"look at this" we need change = David Banks for Mayor

The Revolving Door at City Hall: A Timeline of Topeka’s City Managers Since 2005

Topeka, Kansas, made a significant shift in 2005 when voters approved the council-manager form of government. This change professionalized city leadership by placing day-to-day operations under a hired city manager, while the mayor and council focus on policy.

Since then, the position has experienced considerable turnover — both with permanent hires and interim leaders who step in during transitions and national searches.

Here’s a consolidated chronological timeline of Topeka’s city management since the change:

• April 2005 – April 2006: Neil Dobler (Interim) Former Public Works Director who helped guide the city through the transition to the new government structure. Served approximately one year.
• March 2006 – July 2011: Norton N. Bonaparte, Jr. (Permanent #1) Topeka’s first permanent city manager. Served roughly 5 years and 4 months before being terminated by the council.
• July 2011 – June 2012: Dan Stanley (Interim) Former councilman and state official. Served about one year.
• June 2012 – August 2012: Pam Simecka (Interim) Interim Finance Director who filled a short two-month gap.
• August 2012 – October 2016: Jim Colson (Permanent #2) Served approximately 4 years and 1 month before resigning to return to family in Arizona.
• October 2016 – August 2017: Doug Gerber (Interim) Then-Deputy City Manager. Served nearly 10 months.
• October 2017 – December 2021: Brent Trout (Permanent #3) Served about 4 years before resigning to take a county manager position in North Carolina.
• Early 2022 – September 2022: Short interim period (Details vary by source, with limited public prominence.)
• September 2022 – July 2023: Stephen Wade (Permanent #4) Served only about 10 months before being fired amid controversy.
• July 2023 – June 2024: Richard (Dick) Nienstedt (Interim) Veteran Kansas city manager who provided nearly a full year of steady leadership.
• June 2024 – Present: Dr. Robert M. Perez (Permanent #5) Currently serving. Perez holds a Ph.D. in Education with a focus on organizational leadership.

Patterns and Reflections

In roughly 21 years, Topeka has had five permanent city managers, with an average tenure of about 3.5–4 years. Interim managers frequently bridge gaps lasting from a few months to a full year.

Common reasons for departure include firings, resignations for personal or career reasons, and the natural conclusion of interim contracts. While some turnover is normal in municipal government, this pace is relatively high.

Topeka remains a non-growing city facing stagnation. Population trends show little to no growth, and many residents feel the city lacks a bold, unified long-term vision for the future. Like a flower struggling on a vine, Topeka has real potential — rooted in its role as the state capital and its central location — but consistent, stable leadership will be essential if the city is to build momentum on infrastructure, economic development, and quality of life.

Strong leadership continuity could be the key to breaking this cycle.

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Henry McClure  
785.383.9994
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