Do you want to look at the plans at 37th and Gage?
H
Henry McClure
Time Kills Deals
785.383.9994
444
Tuesday, August 11, 2026
Go Topeka must go -
Here’s a clear, year-by-year summary of GO Topeka’s Investments line from the most recent available financial presentations to the JEDO board and earlier audited statements.
Investments Totals (Statement of Financial Position)
| Period | Investments Balance | Notes / Source |
|---|---|---|
| Dec 31, 2024 (Year-end) | $6,854,865 | Up $325k from prior year. JEDO Feb 26, 2025 presentation |
| Dec 31, 2023 | $6,529,644 | JEDO presentation |
| Sept 30, 2023 | $6,445,600 | Quarterly |
| March 31, 2023 | $6,300,482 | Quarterly |
| Dec 31, 2019 (Audited) | $6,119,422 | Full audit – detailed composition available |
| Dec 31, 2018 (Audited) | $5,996,560 | Full audit |
Composition (from the most detailed source available)
The 2019 audited consolidated financial statements break down the investments as follows (this is the clearest public detail we have):
- Money market fund: ~$3.35 million (Level 1)
- U.S. Treasury Notes: ~$281,000
- U.S. Treasury Bill: ~$149,000
- Certificates of Deposit (carried at cost): ~$2.34 million
Total 2019: $6.12 million
These are conservative, highly liquid, low-risk instruments (primarily government securities and CDs). There is no evidence in the public filings of a large equity stock portfolio or alternative investments.
Key observations from recent years
- The Investments balance has remained relatively stable in the $6.1–$6.9 million range since at least 2018–2019.
- The large overall asset base ($20M–$23M) is driven far more by Cash & Cash Equivalents (often $11–$13 million) and the very large Deferred Revenue liability (typically $16–$18 million, reflecting committed but not-yet-paid incentives) than by the investment portfolio.
- “Board-designated” net assets of $1,787,305 have been consistent for several years and appear tied to the program-related / designated investment category.
- Interest and investment income is budgeted modestly (around $50–55k in recent budgets) and is a minor revenue source compared with the economic development sales tax.
Bottom line: GO Topeka maintains a stable, conservative investment portfolio of roughly $6.5–$6.9 million, consisting mainly of money market funds, U.S. Treasuries, and certificates of deposit. The Form 990 and JEDO financial presentations report only the aggregate total — they do not list individual securities by name or ticker.
Fw: Henry McClure, can you help me reach my goal today?
From: Adriana Raub <adrianaraub@eteamsponsor.com>
Sent: Tuesday, August 11, 2026 8:30 AM
To: mcre13@gmail.com <mcre13@gmail.com>
Subject: Henry McClure, can you help me reach my goal today?
Sent: Tuesday, August 11, 2026 8:30 AM
To: mcre13@gmail.com <mcre13@gmail.com>
Subject: Henry McClure, can you help me reach my goal today?
|
Monday, August 10, 2026
Where in God’s Green Earth Was Go Topeka?
The Maverik deal on Fairlawn should have been a no-brainer.
A private company wanted to take a long-dead, blighted hole at the old Holidome site and put a real business on it. A convenience store and fueling station that would have generated sales tax every single day, real estate taxes for the city, and actual economic activity on land that had been sitting empty and rotting for years. It was the right project, in the right location, for the right reasons.
It would have helped Topeka. Not in some abstract “vision” way. In the concrete way that matters: money coming into the city’s coffers from people buying gas, food, and supplies. Property taxes from a developed site instead of a vacant eyesore. Private capital doing what private capital is supposed to do.
And where was Go Topeka?
Nowhere.
The organization whose entire existence is justified by attracting and supporting new businesses sat on its hands. They should have been down there fighting for it. They should have been the loudest voice in the room explaining why this project belonged in Topeka. They should have been pushing back against the noise, the special interests, and the neighborhood pressure that ultimately killed it. That’s literally their job.
Instead, the City Council buried it 9-1. Only David Banks had the courage to vote for it. Everyone else folded. And Go Topeka? Missing in action. Silent when it mattered. Absent when a sales-tax-generating project needed a champion.
This is not economic development. This is selective advocacy dressed up as economic development. When the right people don’t want something, Go Topeka disappears. When the project is convenient for the connected, they suddenly find their voice. The Maverik deal exposed the pattern in the clearest possible terms.
Their job is not to manage the feelings of the loudest special interests. Their job is not to let the mob rule. Their job is to bring businesses to this community that create real tax base and real activity. On Fairlawn, they failed that test completely.
This is exactly why their public funding needs to end. No more blank checks. No more institutional capture. Let every project stand on its own merit and come to the city and county on an arm’s-length basis. If a deal is good for taxpayers, it should win on the numbers and the facts — not on whether Go Topeka decides to show up that day.
And while we’re at it, every acre of land sitting in Go Topeka’s name needs to be transferred out of their control. Those assets belong to the public. They should not be held by an organization that has proven it will protect its own interests and relationships over the clear economic interest of the community.
The Maverik deal was the test. Go Topeka failed it. They weren’t there when a straightforward, tax-generating private project needed a champion. That failure is not a one-off. It is the logical result of how this organization has evolved — more concerned with managing influence than delivering results for the people who actually fund it.
Enough.
Watch the selective advocacy in action.
A data center is on the table in Shawnee County. The people who live closest to it — the farmers, the neighbors, the regular residents — have made their position clear. They don’t want it. They’ve looked at the water demands, the power load, the noise, the traffic, and the long-term impacts, and decided the trade-offs don’t add up for them. That’s a legitimate point of view.
Go Topeka is involved. They’re facilitating. They’re making introductions. They’re treating it like a priority project in the pipeline. Suddenly this is the kind of development that deserves their full attention and support.
Now go back to the Maverik deal on Fairlawn.
A private company wanted to take a blighted, long-vacant site and put a real business on it — a convenience store and fueling station that would generate sales tax, property tax, and actual economic activity. The kind of project that used to be the definition of economic development. The kind of project that creates ongoing revenue for the city instead of just construction jobs and press releases.
The City Council killed it 9-1. Only David Banks voted for it. And where was Go Topeka — the organization whose job is to chase sales-tax-generating private investment and remove obstacles for business? Nowhere. Silent. Or worse, quietly aligned with the interests that wanted the project dead because the wrong neighbors didn’t want trucks near them.
This is the pattern.
When a private company wants to create real sales tax on dead land, Go Topeka disappears. When a massive industrial facility shows up that half the surrounding community opposes, Go Topeka finds its voice and its energy.
Selective advocacy isn’t economic development. It’s something else. It’s the consistent prioritization of whatever serves the right people at the right time over any consistent principle, over the taxpayers, and over the people who actually live with the consequences.
I don’t have to love the data center to notice the inconsistency. I just have to watch the record.
The Maverik deal should have been the easy one. Sales tax. Blighted site. Private capital. Minimal public risk. Go Topeka should have been the loudest voice in the room fighting for it. Instead, they were missing in action while the only council member willing to stand alone was David Banks.
Now the data center gets the full treatment.
Same organization. Completely different level of enthusiasm. That’s not strategy. That’s selective advocacy. And it’s been the operating system for a while.
I can’t wait to see how they explain this one when people start connecting the dots.
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