Tuesday, July 14, 2026

Bloomberg leans Democrat/progressive on many philanthropic and political issues.

Bloomberg’s Background Michael Bloomberg is a billionaire businessman (Bloomberg LP founder), former three-term mayor of New York City (2002–2013, initially elected as Republican, later independent, then switched to Democrat in 2018 to run for president in the 2020 Democratic primary). He lost that primary. His philanthropy through Bloomberg Philanthropies focuses on data-driven approaches to public health (tobacco, obesity, opioids), gun safety (Everytown for Gun Safety), climate change (Beyond Coal, carbon-free economy efforts), education reform (including charter schools/school choice in earlier work), and Government Innovation — which includes the City Leadership Initiative.

Bloomberg’s giving has a clear progressive tilt on issues like guns, climate, and certain public health regulations, but it also emphasizes pragmatism, evidence, “what works,” performance management, and innovation that appeals across some ideological lines. Critics on the right often see his philanthropy as elite-driven progressive influence; critics on the left have faulted him on policing (stop-and-frisk) and other stances. It is private money, not taxpayer-funded.

The Program The Bloomberg Harvard City Leadership Initiative (launched 2017 with a $32M+ gift, later expanded) is executive-style training for mayors and senior city staff. It covers leadership, negotiation, data/evidence-based decision-making, cross-sector collaboration, innovation/experimentation (prototyping and learning from failure), team-building, and organizational effectiveness in city halls. It includes in-person/virtual sessions, coaching, peer networking with global mayors, case studies on real city problems (housing, economic development, public safety, etc.), and free public resources.

It is not a policy indoctrination program. There are no mandates to adopt Bloomberg’s views on guns, climate, or anything else. Participants take skills back to their own priorities. Many alumni (across political backgrounds) praise it for practical management tools. It is competitive and selective (~40–46 mayors per class).

Selection Process Mayors are chosen through a competitive process focused on leadership potential, ability to drive organizational change in their city halls, and cities that can benefit from strengthened management capacity. It is not an open public application in the usual sense but involves outreach, nominations, and applications reviewed by Harvard faculty and program staff. Political party affiliation is not a stated criterion. Classes include mayors from red states, blue states, and international cities with diverse political leanings. The 10th class (2026) explicitly includes Topeka’s Spencer Duncan.

Spencer Duncan Topeka mayoral elections are nonpartisan — no party label on the ballot. Duncan has publicly stated he is a registered Independent (Unaffiliated) for nearly a decade and was raised in a bipartisan household (one lifelong Democrat parent, one lifelong Republican). He served on Topeka City Council (District 8), as deputy mayor, and works in government affairs (League of Kansas Municipalities). His stated priorities: fiscal responsibility, neighborhoods, housing, infrastructure.

In the 2025 mayoral race, he defeated you (Henry McClure) decisively in both primary and general (roughly 60% to 14% primary; 75% to 24% general). He was sworn in as mayor in early 2026. There is zero public evidence he was selected for the Bloomberg program because he is “secretly a Democrat.” He fits the profile: young, ambitious new mayor of a mid-sized state capital city facing typical challenges in economic development, infrastructure, and governance — exactly the kind of leader the program targets for management capacity-building.

Indoctrination or Democratic Plot for Topeka? No credible evidence supports this.

  • The program teaches skills, not ideology. Useful tools (better negotiation for development deals, data for budgeting/efficiency, leadership frameworks) can be applied by any mayor regardless of politics.
  • Bloomberg Philanthropies has progressive priorities in other areas, but this specific initiative is narrowly focused on how city governments operate better (management, evidence, innovation). It is voluntary.
  • Duncan’s selection aligns with standard criteria for the program, not a partisan conspiracy. Topeka is not being “targeted” any more than dozens of other U.S. and international cities.
  • Conservative critiques of Bloomberg philanthropy are fair game on specific issues (influence of big money, certain policy preferences), but stretching this into “Democrats indoctrinating Topeka via the mayor” lacks supporting facts. It is professional development, not a political re-education camp.

Bottom line on your questions (truthful take): Bloomberg leans Democrat/progressive on many philanthropic and political issues. The program has a technocratic, data-heavy, elite-institution flavor that some on the right view skeptically as subtly aligned with progressive governance styles. However, it is not designed or functioning as partisan indoctrination. Duncan was not picked because he is secretly Democrat (he’s Independent, nonpartisan race). There is no evidence of a coordinated effort to “indoctrinate” Topeka. The real value (or risk) depends on how Duncan applies the management tools — which could include better deal-making or efficiency that benefits local priorities like real estate/development.

The program is privately funded with no direct cost or liability to Topeka taxpayers. 

**The Bloomberg Harvard City Leadership Initiative** is a prestigious, privately funded executive leadership and management training program for mayors and senior city officials, run as a collaboration between Bloomberg Philanthropies, Harvard Kennedy School (HKS), and Harvard Business School (HBS). It is housed at the Bloomberg Center for Cities at Harvard University.

The KSNT 27 News post you shared highlights Topeka Mayor **Spencer Duncan**’s selection for the **10th class** (2026), alongside 45 other mayors from 15 countries (28 U.S. + 18 international cities) serving more than 22 million residents collectively.

### History and Start Date
Bloomberg Philanthropies and Harvard University announced the initiative on **August 25, 2016**, with an initial **$32 million gift** from Michael R. Bloomberg. The first class convened in **2017**. It marked the launch of a dedicated effort to provide mayors with the kind of high-quality executive education and peer learning that corporate CEOs routinely receive but public-sector leaders often lack.

Over the past decade it has grown significantly. In 2021, Bloomberg Philanthropies made an additional **$150 million investment** to establish/expand the Bloomberg Center for Cities at Harvard, broadening support for city leadership research, teaching, and programs. As of the 10th class in 2026, the initiative has served **447 mayors** and **over 3,000 municipal officials** from hundreds of cities worldwide.

### Funding and Taxpayer Liability
**Fully privately funded** by Bloomberg Philanthropies (Michael Bloomberg’s foundation). There is **no taxpayer funding** for the core program, scholarships, coaching, research, or resources. 

Participating cities and mayors incur **no direct program fees**. It functions like an executive education scholarship. Some in-person travel (e.g., initial multi-day convening in New York City or sessions at Harvard) may involve minor costs, but these are generally not burdensome and are not funded by local taxpayers. The program also offers **Bloomberg Harvard City Hall Fellowships** — competitively compensated placements (salary + housing allowance + moving support) of up to two years in participating cities, funded by the initiative.

One participating mayor explicitly noted it was “funded entirely without taxpayer dollars.” There is no evidence of hidden costs, matching requirements, or strings that shift financial liability to cities or taxpayers.

### Program Structure (Flagship Yearlong/Nine-Month Program)
The core offering is a **nine- to twelve-month** intensive experience for selected mayors plus two senior city officials per city. It combines:

- **In-person classrooms** (periodic intensive sessions, often starting with a multi-day convening in NYC; some at Harvard).
- **Virtual sessions**.
- **Coaching and in-city support**.
- **Applied tracks** for senior staff in areas like cross-boundary collaboration, data & evidence use, or innovation/experimentation.
- Access to **Harvard faculty** (HBS + HKS), Bloomberg experts, peer mayors, and research/cases.
- Post-program executive education scholarships for city staff in key functions (economic development, HR, procurement, civic engagement, negotiation).
- Eligibility to host a **City Hall Fellow**.
- Free access to teaching cases, simulations, research, and tools developed by the program (many publicly available).

**Core topics/skills** include strategic leadership & management, negotiation (including public-sector power dynamics and collective bargaining simulations), data-driven decision-making and performance management, cross-sector collaboration, innovation/experimentation (prototyping, learning from failure), breaking down silos in city hall, team-building, and evidence-based problem-solving applied to real city challenges (housing, economic growth, public safety, etc.).

The emphasis is practical and organizational — helping mayors strengthen how their city halls function rather than dictating specific policies.

### Pros and Benefits
**For the mayor personally:**
- Rare, high-caliber executive training modeled on top corporate and public leadership programs.
- Peer networking with dozens of mayors globally and access to Harvard faculty/experts.
- Personalized coaching and applied projects that can deliver immediate wins back home.
- Testimonials from alumni describe accelerated leadership growth, new frameworks, better problem-solving, and feeling like a “much better leader.” High-profile alumni include Pete Buttigieg (former South Bend mayor), Keisha Lance Bottoms (Atlanta), Muriel Bowser (DC), and others.

**For the city and residents:**
- Tools to build higher-performing teams, use data more effectively (potentially saving money and improving transparency/outcomes), negotiate better, collaborate across agencies/sectors, and innovate with lower risk through prototyping.
- Free research, cases, and resources that cities worldwide can use.
- Potential for measurable improvements in efficiency, decision quality, and resident outcomes (e.g., better resource allocation, stronger cross-boundary work on complex problems).

**For taxpayers:**
- **Net positive or neutral at worst** with no direct cost. Better-trained leadership and stronger city hall operations can lead to smarter spending, more effective projects, and improved services — indirectly benefiting taxpayers. Several mayors have cited using data/evidence approaches to allocate resources more strategically and save money.

### Potential Cons and Criticisms
Public criticism is relatively limited and mostly consists of general skepticism rather than documented scandals or failures:

- **Time commitment** — A nine-to-twelve-month program with in-person travel and ongoing work adds to an already demanding mayoral schedule. The opportunity cost of the mayor’s focus is real.
- **Technocratic/elite framing** — Emphasis on data, evidence, innovation, and cross-sector collaboration can feel like top-down “best practices” from Harvard/Bloomberg networks. Some view Bloomberg’s philanthropy overall as promoting a particular worldview (data-driven governance, certain public health/climate priorities). Social media comments occasionally question the “agenda,” though concrete evidence of ideological capture or mandated policies in the curriculum is absent. The content focuses on *skills and management processes*, not partisan policy positions.
- **Perception of influence** — Critics of large-scale philanthropy sometimes argue it gives outsized voice to wealthy donors in local governance. There is no evidence here of quid pro quo or policy strings attached to participation.
- **Variable results in practice** — Like any training, outcomes depend on how aggressively the mayor and team apply the lessons. Research supported by the program itself has noted challenges in cross-sector collaboration (e.g., setbacks leading to blame vs. learning).

Overall, it is widely regarded in public administration circles as a high-quality offering with strong alumni feedback. Major controversies are not evident in available reporting.

### Is It Good for Mayor Spencer Duncan (“the young man”)?
**Yes — significant upside.** Duncan is relatively early in his mayoral tenure (sworn in January 2026 after city council service since 2019 and time as deputy mayor). He brings a background in government affairs, lobbying, MBA-level education, and a focus on fiscal responsibility, neighborhoods, housing, and infrastructure.

This program offers precisely the kind of leadership, negotiation, data, and organizational tools that can help a younger mayor navigate council relations, development deals, budgeting, and complex local challenges more effectively. The global peer network and Harvard access are valuable assets for a mayor of a mid-sized city like Topeka. Alumni frequently report immediate professional growth and practical frameworks they can deploy right away.

### Is It Good for Topeka Taxpayers?
**Likely yes, on balance.** No direct cost. Potential indirect benefits through stronger city hall performance, better-informed decisions on economic development/infrastructure/housing (areas of clear local interest), and access to external expertise and fellows. The risk is low — the main “cost” is the mayor’s time, which is already committed to public service.

Whether it delivers outsized value depends on how Duncan and his team translate the training into Topeka-specific results. Many participants do report positive organizational changes and improved outcomes.

### Key Links for Further Reading
- **Official program site**: https://www.cityleadership.harvard.edu/
- **Flagship program details**: https://cityleadership.harvard.edu/program/city-leadership-initiative/
- **Bloomberg Philanthropies page**: https://www.bloomberg.org/government-innovation/supporting-city-leaders/bloomberg-harvard-city-leadership-initiative/
- **2016 launch announcement (HBS)**: https://www.hbs.edu/news/releases/Pages/bloomberg-harvard-city-leadership-initiative.aspx
- **10th class announcement** (includes Duncan): https://www.cities.harvard.edu/news/bloomberg-harvard-city-leadership-initiative-welcomes-tenth-class-of-mayors/
- **KSNT coverage of Duncan’s selection**: Searchable on ksnt.com (recent local story matching your image).

This is a solid professional development opportunity with strong credentials and no financial downside for Topeka taxpayers. The real test will be in application back home. If you want me to pull specific teaching cases, research papers from the program, examples of how other mayors applied it, or dive deeper into any aspect (e.g., negotiation modules relevant to real estate/development deals), just say the word. Deep dive delivered.

Henry McClure
785.383.9994 

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Monday, July 13, 2026

Watch "How Topeka Municipal Court Supports Accountability and Recovery - Episode #2" on YouTube

https://youtu.be/Nsxr1t2LRCQ?is=FLe5h7GwDXlDsSnK



Henry McClure  
785.383.9994
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time kills deals

RE: Spencer/Karen This Is About Form of Government, Not Personalities

Mr. McClure,

Thank you for your message.  This message serves as confirmation that your email has been received by the council members. 

 

Tonya L. Bailey

Sr. Executive Assistant to the City Council

City of Topeka

215 SE 7th St. Rm 211

785-368-3710

 

“The preceding email message (including any attachments) contains information that may be confidential, protected by the attorney/client or other applicable privileges or that may constitute non-public information. This message is intended to be conveyed only to the designated recipient(s). If you are not listed as a recipient of this message, please notify the sender immediately by replying to this message and then delete it from your system. Use, dissemination, distribution, or reproduction of this message by unintended recipients is not authorized and may be unlawful.”

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From: Henry McClure <mcre13@gmail.com>
Sent: Saturday, July 11, 2026 11:25 PM
To: Spencer Duncan <sduncan@topeka.org>; Karen A. Hiller <khiller@topeka.org>; City Clerk <cclerk@topeka.org>; MCRE Media <mcre1.9999@blogger.com>; Governing Body <governingbody@topeka.org>
Subject: Spencer/Karen This Is About Form of Government, Not Personalities

 

Notice: -----This message was sent by an external sender-----

 

The Mayor can change this today. 

 

Karen this would be a great project for you too. 

 

 

Why the City Manager Serving on the Board of Go Topeka Is Inappropriate Under Topeka's Council-Manager Form of Government

It's Not About the Person — It's About the Structure

By Henry McClure

Topeka, Kansas operates under a council-manager form of government. That is not a minor administrative detail. It is the deliberate structural choice voters made more than two decades ago when they abandoned the strong-mayor system. The entire point of that form is to separate political leadership and policy-making (the elected mayor and city council) from professional, nonpartisan administration (the city manager). When the city manager sits as a director on the board of Go Topeka — the private nonprofit that receives and administers the bulk of the community's economic-development tax dollars — that separation collapses. This is not a personnel issue. It is not about any individual currently holding the office. It is a structural, policy, and ethical problem that would exist no matter who occupies the city manager's chair.

What Council-Manager Government Actually Means

Under the council-manager system used by Topeka (and the majority of American cities of our size), the elected City Council — including the mayor — sets policy, adopts the budget, and provides political direction. The city manager is hired by the council as a professional chief executive to implement those policies, manage day-to-day operations, prepare the budget for council consideration, and give objective advice. The manager serves at the pleasure of the council and can be removed by a simple majority.

The International City/County Management Association (ICMA), the professional body that sets the ethical standards for city managers nationwide, is crystal clear on the role: the manager must remain politically neutral, avoid activities that undermine public confidence in professional administration, and carefully manage any conflicting roles that create even the appearance of a conflict of interest. The manager is not a politician. The manager is not an advocate for private organizations. The manager is the professional hired to execute the will of the elected body without becoming entangled in the advocacy apparatus that seeks to influence that body.

What Go Topeka Actually Is

Go Topeka is not a city department. It is not a government agency. It is a private nonprofit organization — what is commonly called an NGO (non-governmental organization). Many Topekans have never heard the term, but it simply means a private entity that is not part of government yet often receives public money and performs functions that look governmental. Go Topeka operates under the Greater Topeka Partnership umbrella. It holds a long-standing service agreement with the Joint Economic Development Organization (JEDO), the public body created by interlocal agreement between the City of Topeka and Shawnee County.

JEDO is funded primarily by a half-cent countywide sales tax. Those are taxpayer dollars. JEDO then contracts with Go Topeka to design, market, and administer the community's economic-development programs, incentives, and recruitment efforts. In short: public money flows through a public body (JEDO) to a private NGO (Go Topeka) that then recommends, structures, and helps deliver the very incentive packages and development priorities that the City Council and County Commission later vote on — and that the city manager is responsible for implementing on the city side.

This arrangement already raises legitimate questions of accountability and transparency. Placing the city's top professional administrator on the board of the very NGO that lives off those tax dollars multiplies the problem.

Why Dual Service Is Inappropriate

The city manager sits, by virtue of the position, on the Go Topeka Board of Directors. That means the same individual who:

• Prepares and recommends the city budget that may include local matching funds or related economic-development line items; • Advises the mayor and council on the merits of specific incentive agreements, land deals, and development policies; • Implements the council's decisions once they are made; and • Is responsible for the performance of city departments that interact with Go Topeka and the projects it promotes

…is simultaneously a director of the private organization that is the primary recipient and implementer of those same programs. The dual role creates an inherent tension between the manager's duty of undivided loyalty to the City of Topeka and the fiduciary and strategic duties that board membership imposes toward Go Topeka's institutional interests.

Even if every vote is recused and every conversation is carefully walled off, the appearance of conflict remains. Appearance matters. The ICMA Code of Ethics specifically addresses “conflicting roles” and requires members to avoid participating in matters that create either a conflict or the perception of one, and to disclose such situations so the governing body can manage them. Serving on the board of the principal economic-development NGO that contracts with the public sector is precisely the kind of dual role the professional standards caution against.

This Is About Form of Government, Not Personalities

It is essential to be clear: this is not a call to fire or replace any particular city manager. It is not a personal attack. The problem exists because of the position, not the person. Any city manager who accepted a board seat on Go Topeka would face the identical structural conflict. The correct remedy is institutional: the City of Topeka should adopt a clear policy that the city manager (and likely other senior city administrators) shall not serve as voting or non-voting directors on the boards of private organizations that receive substantial public economic-development funds or that regularly advocate before the City Council on matters the manager must implement.

Elected officials — the mayor and council members — are political actors. They campaign, they take positions, they sit on boards if they choose. That is their role. The city manager is deliberately insulated from that world so that administration can remain professional, continuous, and nonpartisan. Putting the manager on the board of the community's most powerful economic-development NGO erases that insulation and turns the professional staff into part of the advocacy network. That is the opposite of what the council-manager form was designed to achieve.

Why It Matters for Ordinary Topekans

Most residents do not follow the bylaws of the Greater Topeka Partnership or the service agreement between JEDO and Go Topeka. They simply expect that when public tax dollars are spent on economic development, the process is transparent, competitive, and free of insider advantage. When the city's top administrator is simultaneously a board member of the organization that helps design and deliver those programs, public confidence erodes — whether or not any actual impropriety occurs. In a city that already struggles with trust in local institutions, the optics alone are damaging.

Moreover, the arrangement blurs the line between public policy and private organizational strategy. Go Topeka has institutional interests: maintaining its contract, growing its programs, demonstrating success to keep the sales-tax funding stream flowing. The city manager's sole institutional interest must be the City of Topeka and the policies adopted by its elected council. Those two interests are not always identical. When they diverge, the dual-hatted official is placed in an impossible position.

A Simple Fix

The solution is straightforward and requires no charter amendment. The City Council can, by simple resolution or policy, direct that the city manager shall not serve on the board of Go Topeka or any similar private economic-development organization that contracts with JEDO or receives substantial public funds for services that the city manager must implement or oversee. The mayor and council members remain free to participate as they see fit; they are elected politicians. The professional administrator should not.

This is not “politically incorrect” in the cultural sense. It is politically incorrect in the original, structural sense: it is incorrect under the political form of government Topeka chose. The council-manager system exists precisely so that professional administration remains independent of the political and advocacy networks that surround economic development. Putting the city manager on the Go Topeka board violates that design. It should stop.

The issue is not who holds the office. The issue is the office itself and the form of government that created it. Get the structure right, and personalities become far less important.

 

Sunday, July 12, 2026

How much a year do the American taxpayers pay farmers in Kansas in subsidies to farm or not to farm?

Around $1–1.5 billion per year in recent years (e.g., ~$1.2 billion in 2024), though it fluctuates significantly with crop prices, disasters, trade issues, and policy changes—sometimes spiking much higher.

This covers direct government payments to Kansas farmers and ranchers via USDA programs, including commodity subsidies (e.g., Price Loss Coverage/PLC, Agricultural Risk Coverage/ARC), crop insurance premium subsidies, conservation payments (e.g., CRP), disaster aid, and ad hoc programs. It includes payments "to farm or not to farm" (e.g., conservation set-asides or deficiency payments when markets are weak).

Key Context and Figures

  • Long-term average (1995–2025): Kansas received roughly $33.97 billion total in subsidies (~$1.1 billion/year average over ~31 years). Kansas ranks 4th nationally.
  • Recent/2024: ~$1.2 billion paid to ~36,570 recipients.
  • 2025 projections: Significantly higher (~$2.7–2.8 billion in direct government payments), driven by supplemental disaster aid, market loss payments, and programs like the Farmer Bridge Assistance to offset low prices/weather impacts. This boosted projected net farm income sharply.

Nationally, farm subsidies (commodity + crop insurance subsidies + etc.) have averaged in the $10–30+ billion range annually in recent decades, with big swings (e.g., trade war/disaster aid spikes). Kansas, a major wheat/corn/sorghum/cattle state, consistently gets a large share.

Important Notes

  • Concentration: Payments heavily favor larger operations. Over two decades, the top 10% of Kansas recipients got the vast majority (~75%+ in some analyses). Many smaller farms get little or nothing.
  • "Not to farm": Includes Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) payments for idling land, plus counter-cyclical/deficiency-style payments when prices are low.
  • Crop insurance: A major component—taxpayers subsidize ~60%+ of premiums on average. Indemnities (payouts) add more in bad years.
  • Variability: Payments surge with low commodity prices, droughts, trade disruptions, or new legislation (e.g., farm bills, emergency aid). They drop in strong market years.
  • Sources: Primarily USDA data tracked by the Environmental Working Group (EWG) Farm Subsidy Database, USDA ERS farm income reports, and state ag analyses. Exact annual totals can vary slightly by what’s included (e.g., loans vs. grants, timing of disbursements).

For the most current or county-specific breakdowns, check the EWG Farm Subsidy Database or USDA ERS resources. These programs aim to stabilize farm income and food production but are often debated for cost, equity, and market distortion.