(Quick note: Your city of Topeka switched to council-manager in 2005 after decades of strong mayor—and it's the form used by many large cities like Phoenix, San Antonio, and Dallas with solid track records.)

Here are five theoretical reasons why a city manager (council-manager) form could be more prone to corruption than a strong mayor system (these are hypothetical arguments critics sometimes raise, even if real-world data doesn't support them overall):

1. Weaker direct accountability to voters: The city manager is appointed by the council and can only be fired by them—not by the public at the ballot box. A corrupt manager could potentially stay in place longer if the council is apathetic, divided, or complicit, whereas a strong mayor faces regular elections and personal political risk.
2. Backroom hiring and cronyism: The council selects and can replace the manager behind closed doors, opening the door to favoritism, deal-making, or hiring someone who owes favors to council members—without the public vetting and campaigning that an elected mayor endures.
3. Bureaucratic opacity and expertise shield: A professional manager controls day-to-day operations, budgets, contracts, and hiring across departments. This creates layers of complexity that can hide subtle corruption (e.g., rigged bids or favoritism in procurement) more effectively than a high-profile elected mayor whose decisions draw constant media and public scrutiny.
4. Potential for council-manager collusion: Without an independent strong mayor acting as a political counterweight with veto power and direct executive authority, the council and manager could form a self-protecting loop—council defers to the "expert" manager, and the manager shields council from accountability.
5. Careerist incentives over public pressure: Managers are professionals who often move between cities for better jobs. This could encourage short-term deals with developers, vendors, or interest groups (revolving-door risks) without the same electoral consequences a mayor faces from angry voters.

You're right that all governments have corruption risks—human nature doesn't change with structure—and the manager form's insulation from politics can feel like it creates opportunities for hidden mischief. I get why it intuitively seems "easier" to you: an unelected bureaucrat running the show with less spotlight.

But what do I think? The data strongly suggests the opposite. The city manager form was literally invented during the Progressive Era (early 1900s) to fight the rampant corruption, patronage, and machine politics that plagued strong-mayor systems (think Tammany Hall-style bosses). Professional training, non-partisan expertise, and ethics codes (like the ICMA's) appear to work in practice.

Nationwide statistics confirm this. The most comprehensive studies on the topic—using federal public corruption conviction data—find that council-manager cities have significantly less corruption than mayor-council (strong mayor) cities:

• A landmark 2019 study in Public Administration Review (Nelson & Afonso, analyzing 146 convictions in cities over 10,000 population from 1990–2010) concluded that council-manager governments are 57% less likely to have corruption convictions.
• A 2023 follow-up study (same authors, covering 1990–2020 with advanced propensity score matching to control for other factors like poverty or population) confirmed the council-manager form reduces corruption risk by an estimated 45–70%, supporting the "professionalism" model over pure electoral accountability.

Only a tiny fraction of cities (66 out of thousands) accounted for all those cases—most had zero. Corruption also dropped dramatically after the city manager reform movement took hold. High-poverty areas correlate with more issues regardless of form, but the manager structure still outperforms.

(Quick note: Your city of Topeka switched to council-manager in 2005 after decades of strong mayor—and it's the form used by many large cities like Phoenix, San Antonio, and Dallas with solid track records.)

Bottom line: While no system is perfect and isolated scandals happen in both (e.g., a rogue city manager in Bell, CA, or alderman bribes in strong-mayor Chicago), the nationwide evidence shows the professional manager form is harder, not easier, to corrupt. It separates politics from administration more effectively. If your personal experience in Topeka suggests otherwise, that could be worth digging into locally—but the big-picture stats don't back the intuition.